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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES (TENTATIVE DRAFT). Recommended by the Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review. Chicago: American Bar Association. 1966. Pp. xii, 123. Paper, $2.
If the American Bar Association (ABA) had undertaken to formulate standards for criminal justice twenty or thirty years ago, postconviction remedies would hardly have been on the agenda. The
very term would have been unfamiliar and largely meaningless.
There was no conception of a general system of judicial review in
criminal cases after a direct appeal had been taken or the time for
appeal had expired. The accepted notion was that, apart from truly
exceptional situations, a criminal proceeding was concluded-and
due process satisfied-after a full hearing in the trial and appellate
courts of proper jurisdiction. The exceptional situations were those
in which the defendant was in effect not given a real hearing, as in
a mob-dominated proceeding, or, under certain circumstances, those
in which he was not provided with counsel. To meet the need for
post-conviction review of the occasional cases which raised questions
of this nature, the federal courts pressed into service the writ of
habeas corpus, and the state courts made use of either habeas corpus
or other venerable common-law ·writs. Given the rarity of the occasion and the limited nature of the questions, these writs could, with
some judicial manipulation, serve adequately as a remedy.
·what has happened during the past two or three decades to
change this situation is now ·well known, though not altogether understood. The exceptional situations, rather than remaining exceptional, have turned out to be only the forerunners of an elaborate
complex of constitutional rights for defendants and, at least in the
federal courts, of a vastly broadened system of collateral review by
which these burgeoning rights can be vindicated outside the traditional channels of trial and appeal. The result, fully realized only
within the last few years, has been to subject state convictions to the
potential of an almost routine federal district court review. This
prospect has had unsettling effects on the state criminal process. It
has exerted pressures on the states to devise for themselves broader
post-conviction remedies than they were otherwise ready to adopt in
order to attempt to retain greater control over their criminal cases
and to protect the integrity of their judgments.
State reactions to these pressures have varied. Some jurisdictions
have done nothing to create post-conviction procedures in the modern
sense, retaining only the common-law writs which in their classic
form are ill-adapted for the review of convictions on the numerous
grounds now available. Others have taken one or another of the
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common-law writs and judicially fashioned a somewhat broader system of post-conviction remedies. Still others have adopted, through
statute or rule of court, post-conviction procedures geared more or
less to the type of litigation stimulated by the expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment and the increased availability of federal habeas
corpus. No state, however, has as yet developed a completely satisfactory procedure. Thus, by the time the ABA launched its project
on minimal standards of criminal justice in 1965, the problems of
federal-state relationships, finality of convictions, and the rising tide
of prison litigants were among the most discussed issues concerning
the courts and criminal procedure. The common focus of these issues
is post-conviction litigation.
It was, then, in response to the felt concerns of the day that the
ABA Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review1 produced
Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies as its initial report.
In giving early attention to this subject, the committee said that "it
anticipated the emphasis placed by Justices Brennan and Clark in
Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) on speedy improvement in
state systems for post-conviction relief as the best way to decrease
federal intervention in the handling of complaints of injustice made
by state prisoners" (p. vii). The Committee quite clearly agrees with
those Justices that state post-conviction systems are, on the whole,
inadequate to meet today's needs. Their attitude and entire report
rest on a series of assumptions, namely, that federal judicial involvement in state criminal cases is undesirable, that federal habeas
corpus will not be reduced in scope, and that the best way to limit
federal post-conviction interference is for the states to develop
systems of review at least as broad as federal habeas corpus. In short,
the committee assumes that it is primarily the existence of federal
habeas corpus which makes desirable the establishment of state
procedures patterned after the 1963 Supreme Court decisions which
recast the federal writ in its present form. 2 If there is any shortcoming in this excellent study, it is the failure to probe beneath
these assumptions to the heart of the post-conviction problem-the
degree of finality to be accorded convictions. However, the committee did recognize this as being the key question (p. 5), and, for
reasons discussed below, may have acted wisely in making these assumptions and thus limiting the scope of its report.
Apart from the pressures created by the expanded federal habeas
I. This Advisory Committee consists of Judge Simon E. Sobeloff (Chairman), James
V. Bennett, Dean C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Jack P. F. Gremillion, Judge Florence M.
Kelley, Judge Theodore B. Knudson, Judge Edwin M. Stanley, William F. Walsh,
and Prof. Herbert ·wechsler. The reporter on post-conviction remedies is Prof. Curtis
~ R. Reitz of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
2. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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corpus remedy, the committee suggests another source of impetus
for its proposals. Changes in the constitutional criteria governing
criminal prosecutions have resulted in a situation in which many
persons presently in prison were put there under procedures that are
no longer constitutionally permissible. A post-conviction procedure
is the only way to afford relief to such prisoners, and, therefore, without regard to federal habeas corpus, the states are under pressure to
establish such remedies to deal with these transitional problems
(p. 1). ·whether states ought to afford relief to convicted persons
claiming past infringement of newly formulated rights turns on a
judgment as to whether these rights should be given retroactive
effect. The committee thinks they should "where sufficient reasons
exist" [Standard 2.1 (vi)]. One sufficient reason in the committee's
view, and the only one it mentions, exists in cases in which "the
change in law sets a new minimum standard of reliability in the
guilt determining process" (p. 38). By incorporating this into its
standards, the committee has adopted the view that retroactivity is
a function of the post-conviction remedy, rather than an aspect of
the newly-born right itself. Although the Supreme Court has not
adopted this view,3 it is submitted that it is in fact the better approach to the problem.
Given these various assumptions, this report is an admirable job.
Perhaps the best words for it are "comprehensive" and "realistic."
Standards are laid dmvn for every imaginable aspect of post-conviction litigation; they deal not only with judicial practices, but also
with the litigants and their counsel. For example, the standards go
beyond in-court procedures to cover such matters as the counseling
of penitentiary inmates (Standard 3.1), the responsibilities of courtappointed attorneys following an adverse decision [Standard 4.4(b)],
and the procedures that are needed to fit the facts of today's in forma
pauperis prisoner litigation. In short, the report abandons the concepts inherited from habeas corpus in favor of direct, simplified
means for resolving the sorts of issues now being presented.
The committee begins by recognizing two major realities. One
is that post-conviction litigation, largely as a result of federal habeas
corpus, has today become an established, routine part of the criminal
process, and thus, functionally, is neither a "civil" remedy nor
an "extraordinary" proceeding. The other is that the initial step
in such litigation nearly always is taken by indigent laymen in prison
without legal counsel. Recognition of these twin actualities has a
significant effect in designing a procedure for post-conviction litigation. For example, since such litigation is a continuation of the criminal process, the venue of the hearing is placed in the court in which
the challenged conviction was rendered [Standard l.4(b)], and the
3. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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respondent is the State, not the individual warden (Standard 1.3).
And since we are dealing with uncounseled laymen, little importance is attached to pleadings, and there is a pervasive emphasismore so even than that found in modern procedure generally-on
getting to the merits of claims and disposing of them on that basis.4
Despite this emphasis, the standards do contemplate two situations in which a court might decline to decide the merits: (1)
where the claim has been "fully and finally litigated in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction" [Standard 6.l(a)]; and
(2) where there has been an "abuse of process" [Standards 6.l(c) and
6.2(b)]. The meaning which the committee gives these two phrases
is worthy of note.
The standards declare that for this purpose an issue "has been
fully and finally litigated when the highest court of the state to
which a defendant can appeal as of right has ruled on the merits of
the question" [Standard 6.l(a)(ii)]. In other words, even if a petitioner fully litigated the identical issue at his trial, he is not precluded from a post-conviction hearing, if he did not also take an
appeal, or if he did appeal and the appellate court for one reason or
another did not pass on the issue. Thus, a person is afforded a second
evidentiary hearing at the trial level. It can quite reasonably be
asked why this should be allowed, assuming that there was a fair
opportunity to appeal and counsel was available. In light of the
committee's position that, "in the main, post-conviction remedies
exist to try fundamental issues that have not been tried before"
(p. 86), is it not going an unnecessary step beyond this to say that a
full and fair hearing during the original prosecution in the trial
court is itself insufficient to prevent a duplicating hearing later?
The committee gives no explicit answer to this; however, one
may surmise from the tenor of the report that it would probably
respond that justice will be better served and most efficiently administered by a court's proceeding to decide the merits of a post-conviction claim than by its spending the same amount of time, or more,
determining whether a fair opportunity to appeal had been in fact
afforded following an earlier trial. Put differently, if one of the
major concerns about repetitious litigation is the consumption of
judicial time, a case can be made for the proposition that in the type
4. In this respect, as in others, the standards depart from the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act, even as revised in 1966. An important difference in form
between the two is that the Uniform Act is a proposed piece of legislation ready to
be enacted, whereas the standards are general guides, some of which must be implemented through legislative action and some through judicial action: to make fullest
use of the committee's standards cooperative efforts on the part of the legislature
and the courts of a state are required. However, as the committee indicates (p. 102),
the extent of agreement between the act and the committee's standards outweighs the
extent of difference. An appendix to the report contains a helpful, section-by-section
comparison of the act and the standards.
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of situation here under consideration judicial time is no more consumed, and may actually be saved, by again litigating the merits.
The court cannot, in any event, avoid a hearing. It must either hear
evidence on the circumstances of the defendant's failure to appeal or
on the merits of defendant's claim. Given that choice, the committee's view, although not specifically articulated with reference to this
appeal problem, is that justice is better served by ruling on the
merits (p. 3). It is difficult to quarrel with this conclusion, however
uncomfortably the idea of a second trial-court hearing of the same
issue may rest amidst traditional notions of adjudication. Indeed,
there is much to be said for the attitude that since post-conviction
litigation is thrust upon us, like it or not, the courts should accept
it and not expend time fencing over threshold procedural questions.
An "abuse of process" sufficient to preclude a determination of
the merits of a post-conviction claim can occur, according to the
standards, as a result of a non-assertion of the claim either at the
original prosecution stage or in a previous post-conviction proceeding. In either case the claim, whether factual or legal, must be one
which the petitioner "knew of and which he deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise" at the earlier time [Standards 6.l(c) and
6.2(b)]. By this standard and the accompanying commentary, the
committee joins the Supreme Court in rejecting the postulate of the
common-law adversary system that a right can be lost simply by not
being asserted at the appropriate point in the proceedings.5 This
issue, usually cast in terms of "forfeiture" or "waiver," has been a
fighting point in the post-conviction arena for some years. One of the
most useful portions of the committee's report is that which clarifies
the terminology and the concepts surrounding this point (pp. 36-37,
88-89).
The committee's analysis proceeds from a distinction between
"foreclosure by judgment" and "voluntary relinquishment." The
former results from the procedural law of the forum concerning the
raising of questions and the finality of judgments. By not asserting
a claim in the time and manner prescribed by procedural rules, a
defendant was traditionally said to have "forfeited" or "waived" the
claim and to be foreclosed by the judgment. The committee, however, prefers to use the term "waiver" to refer only to a voluntary
relinquishment, that is, to a situation in which the defendant intelligently and understandingly foregoes a right. This distinction can
be a crucial one when a federal constitutional right is claimed by a
state prisoner, for the question of whether the assertion of that right
is foreclosed by the prior judgment of conviction is a matter to be
decided under state law, whereas the issue of whether there has been
5. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427-39 (1965).
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a waiver-in the voluntary relinquishment sense-is itself a federal
constitutional question.
The foreclosure by judgment situation is the more troublesome
one. There is a widespread, and historically respectable, view that,
given representation of the defendant by counsel, the entry of the
conviction finally settles (subject to direct appellate review) not only
all questions actually litigated, but also all those which might have
been litigated. The committee expressly rejects this view, except in
cases in which the post-conviction court finds that there was a deliberate and inexcusable failure to raise the issue-an abuse of process.
There are two aspects of the abuse of process standard that re•
main unclarified. First, what does "inexcusable" mean, and what
does it add to "deliberate"? If a defendant has deliberately not raised
an issue at his trial (assuming some acceptable dictionary meaning
of "deliberate"), why should he be allowed to assert it after final
judgment? In other words, if the choice not to assert the right was
deliberate, why inquire into whether the choice was also inexcusable? The second unclarified point is whether the defendant himself
must have personally made the decision not to raise the question at
trial or whether he will be bound by his counsel's decision. The
report uses only the word "he." It would have been helpful to know
whether the committee means to adopt the "deliberate by-pass" concept from Fay v. Noia, 6 which literally calls for a decision by the
defendant himself, rather than his attorney. Perhaps the committee
intentionally left the matter ambiguous, which is a fair way of describing the present state of the federal habeas corpus law on this
point. The commentary states that a right "ought never to be
deemed waived by silence or inaction" (p. 37); but then it proceeds
to say that troublesome difficulties will remain, "notably in matters of trial strategy where the choices of defense counsel have the
potential of being construed as waivers of defendants' rights" (p. 37).
Cited, among other cases, is Henry v. Mississippi,7 a decision which
raised still unresolved questions as to whether this aspect of Fay v.
Noia was being watered down to the extent of reinstating some of
counsel's traditional control over the litigation.
Whether or not the committee intended by its abuse of process
standard to adopt precisely the federal habeas corpus position (whatever that is), it is clear that the spirit of the committee's standard is
the same as the spirit manifested in Fay v. Noia: foreclosure by judgment is rejected; post-conviction adjudication on the merits is not
to be denied if the only objection is that defendant could have litigated the question at his trial but did not do so. Regrettably, the
commentary, which incisively delineates the differing meanings of
6. Id. at 438-39.
7. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).

November 1967]

Recent Books

203

waiver, does not explain why the committee takes this position. An
immediately obvious reason is the presence of federal habeas corpus.
If a state court should refuse a post-conviction adjudication on the
basis of some concept of waiver or foreclosure narrower than the
deliberate by-pass concept of Fay v. Noia and Henry v. Mississippi,
the effect would be simply to pass the petitioner along to a federal
court where there would be no such bar. To prevent this, the states
should employ a standard which at least approximates the federal
test. In other words, we are once again drawn back to the committee's
basic assumption that broad state post-conviction remedies are desirable in order to reduce federal judicial intervention.
'While the prevailing federal practice is a solid enough practical
reason for the states to adopt more relaxed views on foreclosure, it
is not altogether satisfying for those who reflect a bit more deeply
on the question. For them, the inquiry moves one more step: Why,
even under federal habeas corpus procedure, should a convicted person be entitled after final judgment to litigate an issue which he had
a fair opportunity to litigate, with counsel, at his trial? There are
at least two explanations, though the committee does not mention
them.
One rests on a recently arrived at value judgment (which, in
fact, may be no more than a visceral feeling) that the adverse consequences of a criminal conviction are so much more serious than
the consequences of civil litigation that the ordinary rules regarding
the foreclosing of issues should not be applied; stated somewhat differently, the consequences are sufficiently serious to justify overriding the traditional procedural rules and the general desire for orderly, one-time litigation. Nevertheless, looking at the facts, it is
doubtful that a conviction today has more adverse effects on an individual than it had in the past when the foreclosure-by-judgment
principle was intact. Actually the effects are probably less disastrous
because of the trend toward more humane sentences: fines, suspended sentences, and probation are now common; capital punishment is on the way out; and the average sentence is probably shorter.
Nor is there a sound basis for thinking that the failure to raise meritorious issues at trial is more frequent now than in the past; on the
contrary, Gideon v. TVainwright 8 requires counsel in all serious cases,
thus affording considerable assurance-at least more than was previously available-that rights will be asserted. In essence, then, the
discarding of the foreclosure-by-judgment concept, introduced by
Fay v. Noia in 1963 and potentially carried over to the states by the
committee's standards, does not rest on changes in factual conditions,
but rather on a change of attitude about the criminal process. For
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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reasons not very well articulated anywhere, many people-perhaps
most people, including a majority of the Supreme Court and presumably of this advisory committee-have come to think it better
to let an accused have a second chance at raising important issues
such as those concerning constitutional safeguards. Inadvertence or
oversight in not asserting such matters at the first opportunity is believed to be an insufficient basis for denying another opportunity for
their assertion. This attitude is reinforced by the belief that in most
cases the failure to raise a meritorious constitutional claim at the
original trial is, in fact, due to nothing other than inadvertence, mistake, or ignorance. This appraisal is probably realistic, although
there will be situations in which trial tactics can suggest that a point
not be raised, as Henry v. Mississippi acknowledges.
This leads to a second, but also unarticulated, explanation for
the position of the committee and of the Supreme Court-a lack of
confidence in the bar. Feelings of this sort are uncomfortable to discuss and are not often voiced openly, certainly not formally in judicial opinions or in published reports such as the one presently under
consideration. But if one considers at length the design of postconviction remedies, as reflected in federal habeas corpus and in the
committee's standards, and attempts to root out the ultimate why
of it all, he comes almost inescapably to this lack of confidence as
one of the factors without which the no-foreclosure feature of the
post-conviction system would not make much sense. In England,
where mutual confidence is high both within the bar and between
the bench and the bar, a procedural rule undercutting finality of
judgments to this extent is probably unthinkable. Whether such a
rule is sound in this country depends on whether there is a solid
factual basis for the assumption that there are widespread, serious
inadequacies among lawyers defending criminal cases. While we lack
organized empirical data, every lawyer and judge has his own observations and impressions, and perhaps collectively this is enough.
After all, such is the basis upon which men act in fixing many public
policies. It is common knowledge that the educational backgrounds,
intellect, and abilities of lawyers are highly uneven, as is the level
of preparation and performance in particular cases. The question
for anyone evaluating the reach of post-conviction remedies is
whether he is satisfied that these levels dip so low in a sizeable
enough number of cases that a system for post-final judgment review
should be constructed to protect against lawyers' deficiencies. In any
event, this problem should be thought about explicitly and discussed
openly. The legal profession purports to be a learned calling which
controls its membership in terms of both competence and character.
Thus, it is not surprising that there is some uneasiness about ·writing
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into law an arrangement resting on lack of confidence in legal
practitioners.
It is readily apparent that adherence or non-adherence to the traditional concept of foreclosure of issues by judgment is a major key
to the scope of a post-conviction remedy. The other equally important key concerns the grounds which can be relied on to invoke the
remedy, that is, the sorts of claims that may be litigated at the postconviction stage. By manipulating the foreclosure rule, the grounds
for relief, or both, we can broaden or narrow the scope of the remedy
and correspondingly weaken or strengthen the finality of convictions.
For example, providing numerous grounds for attack on convictions
would not greatly weaken finality if issues which could have been
raised at trial are foreclosed by the judgment of conviction. On the
other hand, even though very few grounds of attack are made available, finality might be markedly weakened by rejecting foreclosure
by judgment. The committee's standards, following the pattern of
federal habeas corpus, contemplate a broad remedy, at the price of
finality of convictions. To achieve a maximum breadth, the standards strike along both paths: they prescribe a large catalogue of
grounds for attack and, at the same time, discard the foreclosure by
judgment concept. The only two checks, as mentioned earlier, may
be showings by the State of a prior full and final litigation of the
issue or of an abuse of process.
The grounds for relief provided in the committee's standards are
more extensive than those existing under the federal habeas corpus
procedure where the sole theory available to a convicted state prisoner is that he is being held in custody in violation of the United
States Constitution. Thus, although the standards allow claims that
"the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in violation of the
Constitution" [Standard 2.l(a)(i)], they include in addition numerous other grounds for relief (Standard 2.1). One of the more interesting suggestions is that "evidence of material facts, not theretofore
presented and heard" be included [Standard 2.l(a)(v)]; ordinarily,
this has been a matter for a new trial motion under limited circumstances. Here again, though, one is left wishing that the committee
had undertaken to explain a bit more fully why it recommends these
grounds for relief. It is hardly self-evident that every violation of
the Constitution, prior to entry of final conviction, justifies giving
relief after the conviction has been entered.
As with the foreclosure or waiver problem, an immediate reason
is clearly the existence of federal habeas corpus. Unless the state postconviction remedy is designed to adjudicate all of a prisoner's constitutional claims, a federal court will adjudicate them. But again,
as with the foreclosure problem, this is not altogether an intellec-
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tually satisfying answer. Why should a federal court, or any court,
allow the post-conviction litigation, for example, of whether certain
evidence was obtained by the State unconstitutionally, in a case
where the defendant was represented by counsel and in all other
respects had a fair trial? Considering the realities, questions of this
sort can be meaningfully addressed only to the Supreme Court or
to Congress, for unless federal habeas corpus is reshaped, the pressures will remain on the states to have post-conviction remedies of
equal scope, and under such circumstances debate over the proper
scope of state remedies seems academic.
What is needed, then, if the matter is to be gotten at root and
branch, is a more thoroughgoing study of the federal post-conviction
remedy for state prisoners. This is particularly important if ·we
accept the committee's premise that whatever the scope of the federal remedy, the state remedy should be at least as broad. On this
premise, the proposed standards and the commentary are excellent.
But the really tough questions concerning finality and the criminal
process are not reached unless we get to the federal writ.
The committee rightly notes that "[t]he essential problem is the
degree of finality to be accorded to criminal judgments, a vexing
problem of many strands" about which "[t]here is only a beginning
of scholarly evaluation in depth ..." (p. 34). If such a study were
pursued, it might be fruitful to explore making distinctions between
various constitutional rights for the purpose of determining which
could be asserted through post-conviction procedures and which
could not be. A similar distinction is being made and discussed in
connection with the retroactivity problem. The committee's standards suggest retroactive effect if the constitutional issue relates to
the reliability of the guilt-determining process. Why not apply that
test in identifying grounds for post-conviction relief? One can rationally argue by analogy to the harmless error rule that the interests
in finality should prevail where the constitutional violation has not
touched the reliability of the procedures and evidence by which the
defendant was found guilty.
The committee mentions that "the relevance of inquiry into the
degree of prejudice that an applicant suffered in the proceeding under challenge" is among "the less fully articulated questions of postconviction review" (p. 34). But it then suggests that all of the
presently recognized federal constitutional grounds are sufficiently
fundamental so that prejudice can be assumed. This needs a more
discriminating examination. The assumption that all of a defendant's constitutional rights are "fundamental" had much more validity two decades and more ago than now. Then, the constitutional
limitations on criminal prosecutions were relatively few, and they
were indeed of a fundamental nature. Today, however, there is a
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progressive move toward converting the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights into "a code of criminal procedure." 9 When
we are dealing with a comprehensive, detailed code, it becomes less
convincing to call everything in it fundamental. The right to counsel, for example, can fairly be called fundamental in the sense that
the assertion of all other rights depends upon it, and that it goes to
the essence of a fair and full hearing. Is there not, however, a distinction which can rationally be made for purposes of post-conviction
attack between an infringement of the right to counsel and, for
example, the introduction into evidence by the State of a pistol
obtained from the defendant's house under circumstances making
the search illegal in a case in which the defendant had counsel and
a full opportunity to litigate the issue at trial?
Lack of confidence in the bar has been mentioned in connection
with the rejection of the judgment-foreclosure rule. The same attitude about the quality of lawyers may affect decisions as to availability of grounds for post-conviction relief. If any constitutional
issue were removed as a ground for post-conviction review, it would
have to be with the understanding that defendant had counsel at
trial so that he could have litigated the issue there. It is but a small
step, then, to say that counsel means "competent" counsel, or even
"effective" counsel. To put an extreme case, if it were shown that
the defendant's lawyer was drunk during the trial, we would be
uncomfortable, to say the least, in contending that the defendant
nevertheless should not be able to assert a constitutional claim
through a post-conviction procedure. The effect of making certain
constitutional issues not available as grounds for post-conviction relief would be to transform the post-conviction proceeding into a
forum for evaluating trial counsel. In other words, rather than reducing post-conviction litigation, this would, as a practical matter,
simply shift the focus of the inquiry in many cases from the merits
of the constitutional issue to the performance of the defense counsel.
Convicted prisoners are often both litigious and ingenious. Trial
counsel have already become fairly frequent subjects for post-convention attacks, and they would probably become so more often if
petitioners were prevented from litigating the merits of some of
the presently available constitutional claims in post-conviction proceedings.
Given a choice between litigating all constitutional claims on
their merits and litigating the competence or performance of lawyers, many of the bench and bar would no doubt opt for the former.
Such issues are more manageable and familiar; moreover, no one
can look with enthusiasm on the prospect of making lawyers and
9. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
929 (1965).
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their work the subjects of constant court attacks. Besides, if the assumption of no confidence is well founded, it is possible that more
convictions might be upset on the basis of inadequate defense counsel
than on the merits of the various constitutional issues now available
as grounds for post-conviction relief.
The committee might reasonably have considered that an indepth examination of the finality problems surrounding federal
habeas corpus was beyond its terms of reference. Its job, after all,
was to formulate standards for state post-conviction remedies. In
order to do that within the time expected, the committee seems
justified in making the realistic assumption that federal habeas
corpus will probably be with us in its present form for some time
to come: all efforts to alter the Supreme Court's 1963 decisions
broadening the writ have failed, and Congress instead has now codified a large part of those decisions. 10 Because of this course of events,
it seems fair to say that public opinion has ratified what the Court
has done. American society evidently has grave doubts about making
convictions too final, and it evidently approves abandonment of the
idea of foreclosure by judgment as to constitutional issues in criminal cases. The committee's standards thus are probably coincident
with prevailing national attitudes about the criminal process and,
at the same time, are themselves evidence of these attitudes.
Whatever the proper scope of post-conviction remedies should
be, there is a pressing need-if any such remedies are to be allowed
at all-for specifically designed modem statutory machinery in this
area. Adoption of specially designed procedures would not only improve the administration of justice, but would also relieve the courts
of the headaches of utilizing habeas corpus and other common-law
writs in distorted roles which they were never designed to play.
Even with the imaginative judicial surgery which has been employed,
the "great writ" is still in certain aspects anomalous as a remedy
for attacking convictions. It simply does not quite fit. These kinks
can be ironed out in a statutory remedy aimed at reviewing convictions in their modern context, thereby leaving habeas corpus to its
historic role of providing a means of challenging illegal detention
not pursuant to a conviction.
As a blueprint for state legislative draftsmen and state courts,
the standards and commentary are excellent. They address themselves to all the troublesome questions, such as whether the judge
presiding at the prosecution should preside at the post-conviction
hearing [Standard I.4(c)], whether a heavier sentence should be permissible on a re-trial [Standard 6.3(a)], and whether a sentence not
being served should be subject to attack (Standard 2.3). They recommend useful procedures such as discovery [Standard 4.5(b)] and pre10. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. II 1965-1966).
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hearing conferences [Standard 4.6(a)]. Finally, they put salutary
stress on the State's obligation to supply the court with helpful information in response to every petition [Standards 4.2(a) & 4.3(a)].
Comprehensively and realistically, the standards cover every nook
and cranny of post-final judgment review. While one might differ
on some details of the procedures recommended, the committee's
work is undeniably valuable, for here, at last, in one well-organized
document, are all of the ideas and innovations which have been
bantered about in recent years, plus some fresh suggestions, for making efficient this new phase of the criminal process.
Daniel ]. Meador,
Dean,
University of Alabama Law School

